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Abstract: This paper considers the problem of cooperative power control in dis-
tributed small cell wireless networks. We introduce a novel framework, based on
repeated games, which models the interactions of the different transmit base stations
in the downlink. By exploiting the specific structure of the game, we show that we
can improve the system performance by selecting the Pareto optimal solution as well
as reduce the price of stability.
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1. Introduction
In this paper we consider the problem of cooperative power control in distributed wire-
less networks. In such networks, transmitters can decide their control policy freely.
Because of multi-user interference the decision of the different transmitters are inter-
dependent, which makes game theory a natural paradigm to study the problem of
distributed power control. As the power control game take several times (e.g., because
a transmitter sends several packets), repeated games are considered. In repeated games,
selfish transmitters can have interest to cooperate. This framework is very relevant for
the downlink of small cells networks where small base stations have not much infor-
mation to implement cooperative power control policies. It is realistic to assume that
small base stations are connected but only by low-capacity links. Therefore, repeated
games where only low signalling between the players are a suited framework to address
the problem under investigation.
Repeated games with complete information (every player knows the set of players,
all the action spaces, all the payoff functions) are known to have several outcomes. A
well known result in that field is the so-called Folk Theorem [1, 2] which characterizes
the set of equilibrium payoffs if the players have perfect monitoring (every player is able
to observe at each stage the actions chosen by all the other players), every feasible and
individually rational payoff (at least the minmax point) can be obtained by an equilib-
rium strategy of the repeated game. Whereas the knowledge of perfect monitoring can
be acquired in certain scenarios where appropriate estimation and sensing mechanisms
are implemented, our goal here is to show that some of these information assumptions
can be relaxed by exploiting the specific structure of the networking game. This says
in particular that one specific operating point, a specific Pareto optimal solution or a
global optimum can be approximated by repeated equilibrium play under suitable as-
sumptions. As a consequence, many results on inefficiency of equilibria in static games
can be examined in repeated game setting and the performance can be improved. To
this end, we consider a proximity graph of monitoring which allow us to relax the full
observation assumptions on the other players.
Our contribution is to provide explicit conditions over the coverage game such as
implement an optimal action plan for the long-run game inspired from the work of
Renault Tomala (1998 [3]) : any deviation of a player is followed by an identification
procedure which will isolate the eventual deviator and an appropriate punishment plan.
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One of the main consequence of this result is the possibility to select a specific operating
point, namely a Pareto optimal solution (such as global optimum, Bargaining solution)
which can improve the system performance, and hence reducing the price of stability
(PoS) (the gap between the best equilibrium payoff and the optimal social welfare).
Note that Nash equilibria, Wardrop equilibria, Stackelberg solutions can be suboptimal
and inefficient in generic static games. Under proximity graph of strategic observation,
the repeated game approach can lead to the global optimum if the initial plan is this
operating point (see Theorem 6). In contrast to most of learning algorithms that try to
reach “equilibrium” of the static game, here we examine equilibria of the long-run game
which can be global optimum for the static game. In particular the price of stability is
one.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2., we present the network
model. In Section 3., we analyze the one-shot game between small base stations (SBSs).
In Section 4., we study the repeated coverage game.
2. Network model
We consider S small base stations (SBS) and a large number of mobile stations. The SBS
index is denoted by i ∈ {1, ..., S}. They SBS are assumed to exploit the same frequency
band. Around each SBS, mobile stations are assumed to be distributed geographically in
a plane according to a density λi(x, y) where (x, y) ∈ R
2 correspond to the coordinates
of a mobile station located at the position (x, y). The density λi(x, y) = 0 outside a
range of a certain radius Ri from SBS i. We use the polar coordinate representation:
the radius from the origin is r = (x2 + y2)
1
2 , the angle θ ∈ [0, 2pi[ is determined by
cos θ = x
r
, sin θ = y
r
for r 6= 0,. The relevant channel model to describe this situation is
the interference channel.
In the scenario under investigation, the interference channel comprises S trans-
mitters and a large number of receivers. Let l1, . . . , lS be the location of the SBSs,
li = (li1, li2, li3) ∈ R
3 with li3 6= 0. We assume that the li 6= lj, ∀ i 6= j. We denote by
d : R3 × R3 −→ R+ the Euclidean distance in R
3.
d((x, y, z), (x′, y′, z′)) :=
(
(x− x′)2 + (y − y′)2 + (z − z′)2
) 1
2 .
Let di(x, y) := d(li, (x, y, 0)) be the Euclidian distance from SBS i to a MS located
at the position (x, y).
di(x, y) := d(li, (x, y, 0)) =
(
(x− li1)
2 + (y − li3)
2 + l2i3
) 1
2 ≥ |li3| > 0.
The transmit power of SBS i is denoted by pi. If an MS is located at (x, y) the downlink
SINR associated with SBS i is given by
SINRi(x, y) =
gii(x, y)pi
σ2 +
∑
j 6=i
gji(x, y)pj
(1)
where gii(x, y) = aii(x, y)di(x, y)
−γi represents the channel gain (path loss) of the link
between SBS i and an MS located in the point (x, y), gji(x, y) = aji(x, y)dj(x, y)
−γj
represents the channel gain (path loss) of the link between SBS j and an MS located
in the point (x, y), γj is a real number γj > 2.
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Remark
The mapping (x, y) 7−→ SINRi(x, y) has a finite limit at (0, 0). We can choose the
function aii(x, y) into the form biidi(x, y)
−γi1l{di(x,y)≤Ri} (No interference from i outside
a range of a maximum radius Ri) Similarly,
aji(x, y) = bjidj(x, y)
−γj1l{dj (x,y)≤Rj},
bii and bji are positive constants.
3. One-shot coverage game definition
The one-shot coverage game is defined by the triplet
G = (S, {Pi}i∈S , {ui}i∈S) . (2)
The set S = {1, ..., S} is the set of players who are the SBS, the set Pi = [0, p
max
i ] is
the action space of SBS i, and the utility function of SBS i is defined as follows:
ui(p1, p2, ..., pS) =
∫ ∫
R2
λi(x, y) log2

1 + gii(x, y)pi
σ2 +
∑
j 6=i
gji(x, y)pj

 dx dy (3)
Assume that gii(x, y) has the above form. Then, ui(p1, p2, ..., pS) can be rewritten as
∫ Ri
0
∫ 2pi
0
λi(r cos θ, r sin θ) log2

1 + gii(r cos θ, r sin θ)pi
σ2 +
∑
j 6=i
gji(r cos θ, r sin θ)pj

 rdr dθ (4)
3.1 Existence and uniqueness of the one-shot Nash equilibrium
The players are rational and the above description is common knowledge (every player
is rational know G and every player know that every player is rational and know G and
so on). An important game solution concept is the Nash equilibrium, i.e., a point from
which no player has interest in unilaterally deviating. An action profile P is a pure
Nash equilibrium of G if
∀i ∈ S, ∀ p′i ∈ Pi, ui(p1, . . . , pi−1, pi, pi+1, . . . , pS) ≥ ui(p1, . . . , pi−1, p
′
i, pi+1, . . . , pS)
(5)
We say that a strategy for a player is dominated if there exists another strategy
for her which is better for her no matter what choices the opponents make. Since
such strategies are suboptimal, the player would eliminate dominated strategies. This
dominance analysis reduces the set of possible outcome of the game. In some games,
a dominance analysis leads to a unique prediction of the outcome when players are
rational. We say that these games are said dominance solvable.
The next lemma shows that our one-shot coverage game is a dominance solvable
game.
Lemma 1. The one-shot game is a dominance solvable game.
As a corollary, the game G has a unique Nash equilibrium given by PNE = (pmax1 , . . . , p
max
S ).
The minmax level is determined by PNE. Denote uNEi = ui(P
NE) the utility of SBS i
at the Nash equilibrium.
Copyright c© The authors www.FutureNetworkSummit.eu/2010 3 of 8
3.2 Inefficiency of NE
If there is no interfering ranges between the SBSs then NE is a global optimum (max-
imum sum utility). For interfering ranges of base stations, the Nash equilibrium is
clearly inefficient compared to the global optimum of of the long-run interaction. For
example, for the long-term interaction, a time-sharing solution would be better than
the NE. Next, we define a specific Pareto optimal solution, namely a bargaining solu-
tion (Nash bargaining, Rubinstein bargaining, Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining etc). The
Kalai-Smorodinsky (denoted KS) bargaining [4, 5] is one the bargaining model which
has a very nice geometric interpretation of the problem of “splitting a cake”. The KS
bargaining is a fair solution in the sense that the minimum utility is maximized. More-
over, in the long-run game, the KS bargaining solution achieves the convex hull of the
the feasible utilities and strictly dominate the one-shot Nash equilibrium.
By definition, the KS bargaining solution corresponds to the maximum point of the
region of convex hull of feasible utilities that is located on the line joining a disagreement
point (for example the NE uNE = (uNEi )i∈S) and the maximum utility profile denoted
u¯ = (u¯i)i∈S where u¯i = maxp ui(p). Denote p
KS = (pKSi )i∈S the power vector that
achieves the KS bargaining solution and uKS = (uKSi )i∈S the corresponding utility
profile. In Figure 1, we consider a simple example for which the KS bargaining solution
consist in an fair time sharing. In next section, we develop a repeated approach leading
to the KS bargaining solution.
4. Repeated coverage game
Assume the SBS are synchronized (say at the frame level) and update their transmit
power every frame. We consider a discounted repeated game played over a large num-
ber of frames. Taking into account the past behavior of the player allow to construct
Pareto-optimal equilibrium strategies. The assumption that the players observe the
actions of all the others players, at the end of each stages seems unrealistic in our net-
work game. We suppose here the players are able to sense their environments to detect
the power transmission level of their neighbor. We model this situation using a graph
of strategic observation, saying that a SBS i observes the action power of each SBS
neighbor j ∈ G(i) in the graph G. Strategic signaling is an essential assumption to
guarantee a robust equilibrium condition on the proposed strategic action plan.
The repeated game is denoted Γ = (S, (Ti)i∈S , (ϑi)i∈S , (si)i∈S), where S is the set
of players, (Ti)i∈S is the set of strategies, (ϑi)i∈S is the vector of the long-term payoffs
and si is the strategic observation function of player i : si : P → Si defined by the
observation graph G. If action p ∈ P was played in the last stage, player i will received a
strategic signal si(p) which disclose the information about his neighbor’s actions. From
now on, we assume that, for a given transmission block or game stage t ≥ 1, each device
i knows and take into account the actions that have been played by his neighbors G(i)
in the past, before choosing his stage action pi(t). We denote by p
i(t) the sequence of
actions played before time t and observed by player i: pi(t) = (pi(t), (pj(t− 1))j∈G(i)).
The vector hit = (p
i(1), ..., pi(t − 1)) is called the private history of player i at time t
and lies in the set Hit =
(⊗
j∈G(i)
[
0, pmaxj
])t−1
.
Definition 1 (Players’ strategies in the RG). A pure strategy for player i ∈ S is a sequence
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of functions (τi,t)t≥1 with
τi,t :
∣∣∣∣ Hit → Pihit 7→ pi(t). (6)
The strategy of player i will therefore be denoted by τi while the vector of strategies
τ = (τ1, ..., τS) will be referred to a joint strategy. A joint strategy τ induce in a natural
way a unique plan of action (p(t))t≥1. To each profile of powers p(t) corresponds a
certain instantaneous payoff ui(p(t)) for player i. In our setup, each player does not
care about what he gets on a given block but what he gets over the whole duration
of the game. This is why we consider a payoff function resulting from averaging over
the instantaneous payoff. In order to quantify the fact that the transmitters can value
short-term and long-term gains differently we use the model of infinitely repeated games
with discounting [1]. The averaged payoff for player i can then be defined as follows.
Definition 2 (Players’ payoffs in the RG). Let τ = (τ1, ..., τS) be a joint strategy. The payoff
for player i ∈ S is defined by:
vi(τ) =
∑
t∈N∗
λ(1− λ)t−1ui(p(t)) (7)
where p(t) is the power profile of the action plan induced by the joint strategy τ .
The parameter 0 < λ < 1 is the discount factor which is seen as the game stopping
probability [2]: the probability that the game stops at stage t is thus λ(1− λ)t−1. This
shows that the discount factor is also useful to study wireless games where a player
enters/leaves the game.
At this point, equilibrium strategies in the repeated game can be defined.
Definition 3 (Equilibrium strategies in the RG). A joint strategy τ supports an equilibrium
of the repeated game defined by Γ = (S, (Ti)i∈S , (ϑi)i∈S , (si)i∈S) if
∀i ∈ S, ∀τ ′i , vi(τ) ≥ vi(τ1, ..., τi−1, τ
′
i , τi+1, ..., τS) (8)
4.1 Strategic signal on a Proximity Graph of Base Station
The strategic observation structure is a fundamental in order to define an optimal action
plan and guarantee a robust equilibrium condition at each time of the game duration. In
order to guarantee the cooperation on an optimal operating point (as the KS bargaining
solution), the players SBS should be able to detect any deviating behavior, identify the
SBS which deviate and start a punishment mechanism. Inspired from [3], we first
propose a repeated game strategy leading to the KS bargaining solution. Second we
show that this strategy also satisfy a robust equilibrium condition on for each time of
the game duration.
Definition 4. We propose a strategy that lead to a Pareto-optimal utility vector defined by the
KS bargaining, such that non deviation from this cooperative plan will be profitable.
• The cooperative plan take place from the first stage of the game and consist in playing
the KS bargaining power profile pKS3.2 as long as no deviation is detected.
• If a player deviate, then begin the procedure of the sets of suspects.
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• After the end of the procedure, start an adequate punishment plan targeted at the devi-
ator.
Procedure of the set of suspects
Using the results of Renault Tomala (1998 [3]), we define the procedure of the set
of suspects which spread the identity of the deviator among all the players in a finite
number of stages. To implement this strategy, the graph of strategic signalling should
satisfy the following 2-connectivity property.
Definition 5. A graph G is 2-connected if G is connected and for each i ∈ S, the graph Gi
(when player i has been removed) is connected.
We give an explicit description of the procedure of the set of suspect. We refer
to [3] for detailed proofs and intuitive examples. First divide the stages into block of
length l = log(2S). Each subset N ⊂ S of player is mapped into a sequence of actions
p(1), ..., p(l) which is publicly known. The sequences of power level are used to encode
every subset of players in order to communicate between the players. If during some
block m, the neighbor j of player i do not follow the main plan. Then, player i elabo-
rate a set of suspect including player j and other possible deviating neighbors. At the
beginning of block m + 1, he play the sequence of moves corresponding to his set of
suspect. Now, from block to block, the players confront their set of suspect with their
neighbors, adding the new suspects and excluding innocents players. The 2-connectivity
property is essential to innocent all the players except the deviator. The date at which
a player k enter in the set of suspect of player i and of player j is predictable, knowing
the structure of the graph. If player k did not deviate, then another player, say i,
will remark an incoherence between the date of the set of suspect including k and the
length of the shortest paths from k to i. Then player i exonerate player k so as his
neighbor in the next block. The identity of the deviator become common knowledge
after n¯ = l ·max(1, 2l− 5) stages.
Punishment Plan Once the procedure of the set of the suspects finish, every SBS
know the identity of the deviating SBS i ∈ S. The punishment plan of the strategy
consist for the neighbor G(i) of player i in playing a one-shot Nash equilibrium pNE
until the end of the game whereas the other players continue to play the optimal KS
bargaining pKS action power (see Fig. 1).
Such a strategy is proved to lead to an optimal operating point such that no deviation
from the above algorithm could be profitable.
Theorem 6. If G is 2-connected, the discount factor satisfy the following condition
∀i ∈ S, λ < 1− n¯
√
u¯i − uKSi
u¯i − uNEi
(9)
Then the above strategy (4) is an equilibrium strategy.
Note that any other feasible utility vector characterized by the Folk theorem could
be considered here.
Copyright c© The authors www.FutureNetworkSummit.eu/2010 6 of 8
Proof. Suppose a player i deviates, thus the procedure of the suspect spread his identity
among the players and the punishment phase push down his payoff under uNEi until the end
of the game. Compare the total deviation payoff :
n¯∑
s=1
λ(1− λ)s−1u¯i +
∑
s≥n¯+1
λ(1− λ)s−1uNEi <
n¯∑
s=1
λ(1− λ)s−1uKSi +
∑
s≥n¯+1
λ(1− λ)s−1uKSi
⇐⇒ (1− (1− λ)n¯)(u¯i − u˜i) < (1− λ)
n¯(uKSi − u
NE
i )
⇐⇒ λ < 1− n¯
√
u¯i − u
KS
i
u¯i − uNEi
The recursive structure of the discounted utility function implies that this inequality does not
depends on a particular stage. This condition, over the stop probability λ insures that the
equilibrium condition is valid for every player in every stage of the game, thus the proposed
strategy is an equilibrium strategy of the repeated game.
5. Numerical Results
Our theoretical result are illustrated with a valid simple model of two SBS. In figure 1
we derive the achievable utility region for our two base stations considering the utilities
defined by equations 3 where the densities λi(x, y) are supposed to be uniform and
the channel gains gii(x, y) are constant over the range of SBS i. This figure depicts
the utility region and it’s convex hull with the Nash equilibrium utility and the KS
bargaining utility. The repeated game approach improved the utility of both SBS.
6. Concluding remark
We have studied a proximity-based network coverage games and have shown that the
KS bargaining utility can be achieved for our model of discounted repeated game.
This result is general and could be applied in a larger class of communication game
over a fixed network. It would be nice to investigate an application of the suspect’s
procedure to classical web-protocols. From the game theoretical point of view, it would
be interesting to extend this result to sub-game perfect equilibrium or to relax the
information hypothesis or to introduce a stochastic graph.
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Figure 1: Utility region of coverage repeated game.
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